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and fix Android AArch64 BionicDynamicLinker (Bug 1122)
- Bulk Permissions
ProcAddressTable.reset(..) performs address lookup in one block.
Now claiming all permissions upfront once, and releasing them afterwards.
- Cleanup DynamicLinker impl.
Proper top-down impl. of DynamicLinkerImpl,
handling all security code and validations.
- Fix Android AArch64 BionicDynamicLinker (Bug 1122)
Dalvik uses diff RTLD_* defines for AArch64!
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c47bc86ae2ee268a1f38c5580d11f93d7f8d6e74)
Code Clean-Up based on our Recommended Settings (jogamp-scripting c47bc86ae2ee268a1f38c5580d11f93d7f8d6e74)
- Change non static accesses to static members using declaring type
- Change indirect accesses to static members to direct accesses (accesses through subtypes)
- Add final modifier to private fields
- Add final modifier to method parameters
- Add final modifier to local variables
- Remove unnecessary casts
- Remove unnecessary '$NON-NLS$' tags
- Remove trailing white spaces on all lines
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Signed-off-by: Harvey Harrison <[email protected]>
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openLibraryGlobal(..) and lookupSymbolGlobal(..) - removing duplicate code.
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access (2)
- Completes 23341a2df2d2ea36784a16fa1db8bc7385351a12
- Replace 'DynamicLinker' interface w/ well documented one
- All DynamicLinker methods are now considered secure, i.e.:
- open/lookup and close utilize reference counting on handle via a hash map.
- lookupSymbol(..) and close(..) impl. validate the passed library handle
whether it's retrieved via open*.
This is the fast path, not that expensive.
- lookupSymbolGlobal(..) performs
Check acccess of 'new RuntimePermission("loadLibrary.*")' if SecurityManager is installed.
This is the slow path.
- DynamicLibraryBundleInfo now reflects the security requirements,
i.e. whether priviledged access is needed.
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values; Using same pattern for Mac OS X.
Add Bionic specialization using Bionic's non POSIX values
- derive from UnixDynamicLinkerImpl
- specify own flag and mode values
- use UnixDynamicLinkerImpl native code
Using same pattern for Mac OS X
- derive from UnixDynamicLinkerImpl
- specify own flag and mode values
- use UnixDynamicLinkerImpl native code
- drop MacOSXDynamicLinkerImpl native code
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and privileged access)
This review focuses on how we perform permission checks,
or better - do we circumvent some assuming full privileges ?
Some native methods do need extra permission validation, i.e. loading native libraries.
Further more AccessController.doPrivileged(..) shall not cover generic code
exposing a critical feature to the user.
Further more .. we should rely on the SecuritManager, i.e. AccessControlContext's
'checkPermission(Permission)' code to comply w/ fine grained permission access.
It is also possible to have full permission w/o having any certificates (-> policy file).
+++
We remove implicit AccessController.doPrivileged(..) from within our trusted code
for generic methods, like Property access, temp. files.
+++
SecurityUtil:
- Remove 'getCommonAccessControlContext(Class<?> clz)',
which returned a local AccessControlContext for later restriction
if the passed class contains all certificates as the 'trusted' GlueGen class has.
- Simply expose convenient permission check methods relying on
SecurityManager / AccessControlContext.
PropertyAccess:
- 'protected static void addTrustedPrefix(..)' requires AllPermissions if SecurityManager is installed.
- Remove implicit doPrivileged(..) triggered by passed AccessControlContext instance,
only leave it for trusted prefixes.
IOUtil:
- Remove all doPrivileged(..) - Elevation shall be performed by caller.
DynamicLinker:
- 'public long openLibraryLocal(..)' and 'public long openLibraryGlobal(..)'
may throw SecurityException, if a SecurityManager is installed and the dyn. link permission
is not granted in the calling code.
Implemented in their respective Unix, OSX and Windows manifestation.
Caller has to elevate privileges via 'doPrivileged(..) {}' !
+++
Tests:
- Property access
- File access
- Native library loading
Manual Applet test (unsigned, but w/ SecurityManager and policy file):
> gluegen/test/applet
Applet has been tested w/ signed JAR w/ Firefox and Java7 on GNU/Linux as well.
Manual Application test (unsigned, but w/ SecurityManager and policy file):
com.jogamp.junit.sec.TestSecIOUtil01
- Run w/ SecurityManager and policy file:
- gluegen/scripts/runtest-secmgr.sh
- Run w/o SecurityManager:
- gluegen/scripts/runtest.sh
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Signed-off-by: Harvey Harrison <[email protected]>
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- Hold DEBUG, DEBUG_LOOKUP in DynamicLookupHelper
- Tool complete only if named tool's GetProcAddressFunc is avail
- Allow no tool/glue lib's
- Use DEBUG_LOCKUP for lockup symbol trace
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GluegenVersionActivity uses ApplicationContext
Hide DynamicLinker impl.:
- com.jogamp.common.os.*DynamicLinkerImpl -> jogamp.common.os
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